Provide an argument for the claim that (some) mental states are not identical to any brain state Explain why the argument is va

It also provides reason why that argument is valid and explains the resources the monist has at her disposal to undermine our confidence in the soundness of this argument. It also evaluates the response of a monist to the dualist argument that has been provided. The argument for the claim that some mental states are not identical to any brain state is supported by various premises. First, phenomenal properties can only reside in mental substances and not physical objects such as the brain. Second, physical bodies like the brain have spatial properties while minds do not have spatial properties. Third, a mind thinks while physical bodies such as the brain do not think. Fourth, a mind is known to exist with certainty while physical bodies like the brain lack that property. Therefore, in conclusion, some mental states are not identical to any brain state, and a mind is distinct from every physical state. This argument is valid because thinking about things involves intentionality, which is a property of nonphysical things (Mandik). For instance, a brain, which is purely physical, cannot think about things that do not exist in time and space. However, a mind can think about things that do not exist in time and space. Secondly, the brain cannot have intentionality because intentionality is very strange. People also think about things in the far future and distant past via their minds (Mandik). Therefore, a mind is distinct from every physical body, including the brain. Secondly, physical bodies are known via senses, but this senses ca be deceived (Mandik). Something that seems to exist may not exist, in real terms. One cannot be wrong about existence of his or her own mind. Minds are known to exist in certainty while physical objects may not be known to exist with certainty. Therefore, a mental state is known to exist with certainty while physical bodies such as the brain lack that property, and as such, a mind must be very distinct from every physical body, the brain include (Mandik). However, this dualist argument is subject to rejection by proponents of alternatives to dualism such as monism. To undermine our confidence in the soundness of this argument, the monist has various resources at her disposal. First, monism rejects the premise of this dualist argument that the mind is immaterial. Therefore, the question goes, how can a mind, which is considered to be immaterial influence the physical brain (Seybold 89)? Also, how can a non-physical soul or mind affect a physical body, such as the brain (Seybold 90)? Secondly, neuroscience states that the brain is clearly necessary for mental states to occur, but a particular mental state is not identical to a particular brain state. Consequently, some brain state must exist for the mental event to take place, but no particular brain state can be mapped onto the specific mental event in a one to one manner. Monists argue that mental activities emerge from the brain (Seybold 90). Monism agrees with dualism that the mind can, and does affect the brain or the body, but monists reject this argument because it is not explained how the mind can affect the body, if the body and mind are of two different substances, as required in dualism (Seybold 90). Therefore, it is impossible for the physical body to be moved by a mind, which is not part of the physical world, according to monism. It should also be noted that body processes such as thinking require energy and the mind,