# Quantum Cryptography

Running Head: QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY By Quantum Cryptography

Quantum cryptography’s main strength is its predominantly good way of generating long, arbitrary codes (Cobourne and Cid, 2011, p. 5). A second strength of quantum code allocation is that one can use a more or less short input to produce ideally secure and arbitrary codes. This feature allows two users to share a secure code and validate the original quantum dialogue. Applying part of the product of this QKD term to validate an upcoming QKD term shows that the approaching session is also ideally secure. As a result, one can run QKD terms nearly continuously without losing security while expanding the first, short code. Both properties form a third strength of quantum cryptography in terms of security. This strong point occurs from every new QKD term code being free of all formerly used codes as this independence lowers the number of methods a criminal can infiltrate the system (Cobourne and Cid, 2011, p. 5).

A fourth strength is the future proofing of security offered by QKD. Even when a malefactor breaks through a cryptographic system at any indefinite period in the future, former messages conveyed through it stay secure (Cobourne and Cid, 2011, p. 5). Mathematics has demonstrated the absolute security of QKD networks. Even when dealing with a rival that has endless supplies of time and energy, security of QKD networks are unbreakable.

One weakness of quantum cryptography is that quantum mediums are only functional over limited space (Rothke, 2007, p. 1055). This is a technical weakness as it occurs when one evaluates the realities of QKD application. Today, quantum mediums cannot convey data quick enough to offer sufficient levels of service, which forms a second technical weakness. Thirdly, quantum optic gear is susceptible to attacks. Quantum cryptography requires costly setups for upholding quantum processing, which serves as a weakness for mathematics, computer, and physics researchers who cannot afford such infrastructure (Cobourne and Cid, 2011, p. 6).

Another weakness is the possibility of quantum cryptography “killing” mathematical progressions at any period in the future irrespective of quantum computing advancements (Rothke, 2007, p. 1055). Commercially, the promise of ideal security may not be a significant enough imperative for businesses to permit the cost of customized gear and infrastructure (Nano 2014). Since conventional cryptography offers more than sufficient security, businesses will consider the uncertain advantages of quantum cryptography an unworthy risk and weakness (Lydersen et al., 2010, p. 686).

Quantum cryptography is hackable when the QKD is built incorrectly. Hacking is possible by distorting a message once the hacker acquires the user’s secret code. Distorting a message needs the hacker to determine the factors of a figure that is the product of two extremely big prime numbers (Nano 2014). Normally, quantum cryptography makes these prime numbers ineffably big that the processing abilities of today’s computers would require more than the universe’s lifespan to crack it. However, weak codes are products hackers can use to factor these prime numbers with much less effort than normal computing power. In addition, a hacker can use an intense pulse to blind a sensor, making it incapable of seeing the photons that store the secret code (Lydersen et al., 2010, p. 686).

References

Cobourne S and Cid, C 2011, ‘Quantum key distribution: Awesome or pointless?’ Royal Holloway Series 2011, pp. 1-13.

Lydersen L, Wiechers C, Wittmann C, Elser D, Skaar J, and Makarov, V 2010, ‘Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination’ Nature Photonics vol. 4, pp. 686–689, viewed 24 January 2015, http://www.nature.com/nphoton/journal/v4/n10/full/nphoton.2010.214.html

Nano 2014, Vulnerability in commercial quantum cryptography, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, viewed 24 January 2015, http://nanomagazine.co.uk/index.php?option=com_content&.view=article&.id=1011%3A vulnerability-in-commercial-quantum-cryptography&.Itemid=159

Rothke B, 2007, ‘An Overview of Quantum Cryptography’ Information Security Management Handbook, Sixth Edition, pp. 1045–1057, viewed 24 January 2015, http://www.infosectoday.com/Understanding_Cryptography/Articles/Quantum_Cryptogr aphy.pdf